MAYBE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE REASON THEY
CALL IT A DERIVATIVE LAWSUIT – THE IMPLICIT
CORPORATE DUTY TO HEDGE
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Abstract
Derivatives became the primary scapegoat after the financial markets
crashed in 2008 and many large investment banks collapsed in the aftermath.
Derivatives were thought to be far too risky and not transparent, even though
derivatives were originally contrived in order to mitigate risk. Contrary to popular
opinion, if used properly, derivatives are very effective in the mitigation of price
changes, currency exchange, and interest rate risk. Moreover, the current
regulatory landscape encourages the use of derivatives to hedge risk.
The current financial environment encompasses the widespread use and
acceptance of products that allow hedging to be a common trade practice. The
failure to use such financial products in order to hedge risks or to acknowledge
hedging opportunities that can add to the profitability of the corporation may be a
violation of a corporate fiduciary’s duty to hedge risk.
This Article seeks to determine whether, under existing case law, there is
an implicit corporate duty for corporate directors to educate themselves on the use
of derivatives in order to hedge risk. Further, this Article asserts that United
States law implies a corporate duty to hedge risk within the umbrella duty of care.
Finally, this Article maintains that a corporate director should take prudent action
to invoke the protections of the business judgment rule, consult with experts in
the field, and delegate risk management to those individuals who may be more
qualified to assess corporate risk.
I. Introduction
The 2008 market collapse marked a watershed moment in the history of
derivative instruments. Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG’s holding
company were all overleveraged with credit default swaps. 1 When the market
went against them, three of the largest investment banks in the world collapsed. 2
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, derivatives had become
synonymous with risk. Even Warren Buffet referred to credit default swaps as
1. The Bet That Blew Up Wall Street, CBS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/210018560_162-4546199.html.
2. Id.
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“financial weapons of mass destruction.” 3 Further, J.P. Morgan’s recent and well
publicized $2 billion dollar loss was attributed to credit default swaps. 4
Originally, derivatives were developed out of a need to hedge risk, and, if
used properly, effectively mitigate price changes and currency exchange and
interest rate risk. Moreover, the current regulatory landscape encourages the use
of derivatives to hedge risk.
This Article seeks to determine whether, under existing case law, there is
an implicit corporate duty for directors to utilize hedging strategy. In other words,
are corporate fiduciaries required to educate themselves regarding the use of
derivatives to hedge the risks of a corporation?
To answer this question, this Article is divided as follows. Part II examines
the development of risk management tools and the increased demand to hold
corporate fiduciaries accountable. Part III asserts that current U.S. law implies a
corporate fiduciary duty to hedge. Couched in federal statutes are concessions to
reduce the cost of mitigating risk. Further, hedging not only mitigates risk, but it
adds value to the corporation. Existing case law regards the duty to hedge as an
outgrowth of the duty of care, which requires that corporate fiduciaries have all
material information reasonably available to make an informed decision.
Furthermore, the reasonably informed director must take prudent action to invoke
the protections of the business judgment rule. This section concludes by pointing
out that directors also have an implied duty to consult experts or delegate risk
management to those adequately skilled to perform their duty. However, corporate
fiduciaries have a duty to monitor delegates, and, thus, delegation does not sever
the corporate fiduciary from liability. Part IV presents a general conclusion.
II. Risky Business
A. The Ripple Effect
“All of life is the management of risk not it’s elimination.” 5 Indeed, risk is
the ever-present adversary that challenges every fiduciary in the business world. 6
Currency exchange and interest rate volatility create risks for multinational
corporations, fluctuating oil and gas prices affect the bottom line of airline
companies, and the ebbs and flows of commodity prices impact manufacturers. 7
The prosperity of market participants is always at the mercy of variations in the
financial market, as well as the regulatory landscape. 8 The ever-changing nature
of the market presents the challenge of unpredictable outcomes (i.e., how to hedge
risk). 9
3. Warren Buffet, Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Investors (2002).
4. Rupert Neate, J.P. Morgan’s Loss: What Is a Credit Default Swap?, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2011, 7:27
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/may/14/jp-morgan-loss-credit-default-swap.
5. Randall H. Borkus, A Trust Fiduciary’s Duty to Implement Capital Preservation Strategies Using
Financial Derivative Techniques, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 127, 146–48 (2001) (quoting Walter Wriston,
former chairman of Citicorp).
6. Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance of the
Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 986 (1995).
7. Id. at 986–87.
8. Id. at 986.
9. Id.
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Most analysts agree “that the financial environment is riskier today than
. . . in the past.” 10 However, the ability to manage risk has not remained
stagnant. 11 One commentator notes that “[t]he saving grace of this riskier
financial environment has been the spawning of financial innovation.” 12 In other
words, “[f]inancial innovation is a demand-driven phenomenon that always has
been fueled by market risk.” 13 When markets are not overly volatile, “simple,
conservative investments satisfy the market.” 14 However, as markets face greater
volatility and less certainty, “the market always responds with a proliferation of
risk management instruments.” 15
Financial innovation provides the contemporary fiduciary with
sophisticated risk management instruments to better evaluate and manage risk. 16
The availability of such risk management instruments allows fiduciaries to
regularly deal with price uncertainty, and, thus, hedge risk exposure. 17
Indeed, hedging has become the standard rather than the exception in
global markets. A 2009 survey conducted by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association showed that over ninety-four percent of the world’s
Fortune 500 companies use derivatives to hedge business and financial risk,
including ninety-two percent of the U.S. companies surveyed. 18
The widespread use and acceptance of such products evinces that hedging
is a common trade practice and suggests an implicit duty to hedge. As one top
airline executive commented, “If we don’t hedge jet fuel price risk, we are
speculating. It is our fiduciary duty to try and hedge this risk.” 19
Labor jet fuel is the second largest operating expense for airlines. 20
Ever-changing fuel prices present a major challenge for airlines because of their
highly volatile nature. 21 Further, given the highly competitive nature of the
business, airlines are unable to simply pass the costs onto customers. 22 Thus, if
airlines can hedge risks associated with the cost of fuel they can more accurately
estimate budgets and forecast earnings. 23 For a corporation, profitability as well
as survival depends on mitigating risk and controlling price uncertainty.

10. Borkus, supra note 5 (quoting CHARLES W. SMITHSON & CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR., MANAGING FINANCIAL
RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION 2 (1995)).
11. Borkus, supra note 5, at 147.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 146–48. “The volatility of the 1970s created an environment of price uncertainty with severe
changes in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices.” Id.
14. Id. at 147.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. International Swaps and Derivatives Assoc., Inc. News Release, Apr. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf.
19. Dave Carter, Dan Rogers, & Betty Simkins, Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry: The Case of
Southwest Airlines, * 1 (quoting Scott Topping, Director of Corporate Finance for Southwest Airlines)
(emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 1.
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B. The Growing Demand for Accountability
Amplified risk in the global financial markets has resulted in increasing
pressure on corporate fiduciaries to implement appropriate hedging strategies. 24
The contemporary corporate fiduciary is now expected to remain well-informed as
to the nature of the risk inherent in the markets, the availability of the products
to hedge the risk, and the feasibility of implementing hedging strategies to manage
corporate risk. 25 Before the advent of financial derivative products, “a corporate
fiduciary could blame . . . poor results on the movement of the dollar or unforeseen
interest rate changes or commodity price shocks.” 26 Because of the limitations in
hedging instruments to insure against price uncertainty, shareholders had to
accept the response. 27
However, with the development of financial derivative products and the
availability of risk management tools, such a response quickly became
unacceptable. 28 Additionally, corporate shareholders are better informed and
increasingly more sophisticated. 29 Therefore, they expect corporate management
to hedge company assets against negative price movements. 30 As a result,
shareholders—individual, corporate and institutional—now hold their fiduciaries
accountable for hedging against all forms of price uncertainty. 31
The concept of risk management is more than a bank or corporation buying hedges;
it is the idea of protecting the dollar value of the business. Corporate fiduciaries
have a general duty to understand how to protect the dollar value of the business.
The positive impact that risk management disclosure has had upon a company’s
net cash flows further evidences this point. Therefore, implicit in a corporate
fiduciary’s duty to protect the dollar value of the business is the duty to hedge
insurable risks. 32

III. A Duty to Hedge Emerges
A. The Legal Framework

1. Hedging Adds Value
As a general principle, a corporation is primarily organized to create value
for its shareholders. 33 Implicit to this principle is protecting the dollar value of a
business. To a corporate fiduciary, protecting a corporation’s dollar value is
analogous to a trustee’s duty to protect the trust corpus—it is the cornerstone of
the fiduciary duty.

24. Id. at 148 (citing SMITHSON & SMITH, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 65).
25. Carter, Rogers, & Simkins, supra note 19, at 148.
26. Id. (quoting Edgeward & Eller at 1045).
27. Id. (citing SMITHSON & SMITH, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 65).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (merging modern financial innovation with the
trust doctrine; therefore, hedging with sophisticated risk management instruments is prudent).
32. Borkus, supra note 5, at 154–56.
33. See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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However, hedging does more than protect the dollar value of a business.
Empirical evidence shows that the value of firms that hedge currency risk, on
average, is higher by about five percent. 34 This hedging premium is statistically
and economically significant. With a median market value of about $4 billion, this
translates into an average value added of almost $200 million for firms using
foreign currency derivatives to hedge price uncertainty—a very large effect. 35
In the case of fuel hedging among U.S. airlines, empirical evidence shows
an even higher hedging premium of about fourteen. 36 This is because the financial
risk associated with volatile fuel prices is economically very significant for
airlines. 37 Hedging adds value to a corporation by “decreasing taxes . . . [and the]
expected costs associated with financial distress . . . [and] avoiding the errors in
the investment decision that are induced by conflicts between bondholders and
shareholders.” 38 Moreover, hedging allows firms, particularly airlines, to expand
operations when times are bad for the industry, thereby alleviating the problem
of underinvestment. 39
As noted above, hedging can also reduce tax exposure. Code § 1221(a)(7)
provides an exception to capital asset treatment for qualifying “hedging
transactions.” “Hedging transactions” are defined as:
[A]ny transaction entered into by a taxpayer in the normal course of its trade or
business primarily to manage risks of interest rate or price changes, or currency
fluctuations with respect to ordinary property that is held, or to be held, by the
taxpayer, or to manage risks of interest rate, price changes or currency fluctuations
with respect to borrowings made or to be made, or ordinary obligations incurred,
or to be incurred by the taxpayer. 40

Furthermore, the Treasury has the authority to issue regulations extending the
definition of “hedging transactions” to the management of other risks. 41
As a result, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”)
promulgated accounting and disclosure standards for a corporation’s use of
derivatives to hedge. 42 The FASB is designated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission “to establish and improve standards of financial accounting and
reporting for the guidance and education of the public, including issuers, auditors
and users of financial information.” 43

34. George Allayannis & James Weston, The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market
Value, REVIEW OF FIN. STUDIES 14, 243–76 (2001).
35. Id.
36. David Carter, Daniel Rogers, & Betty Simkins, Does Fuel Hedging Make Economic Sense? The Case
of the U.S. Airline Industry, FIN. MGMT., 29–30 (May 29. 2003).
37. Id.
38. SMITHSON & SMITH, supra note 24, at 505–06.
39. Carter, Rogers, & Simkins, supra note 36.
40. Treas. Reg., 26 U.S.C. § 1.1221-2(b); I.R.C. § 1221 (b)(2).
41. Id.
42. FASB Statement 133 Implementation (Derivatives), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/DerivativesPage&cid=900000015218&pid=1218220137106
(last visited May 2, 2012); see also Summary of Statement No. 161: Disclosures About Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities – An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum161.shtml (last visited May 2, 2012).
43. Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., www.fasb.org (last visited May 10, 2012).
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Hedging also adds to a business’s value by reducing the probability of a
firm’s financial distress. 44 For example, where a volatile firm provides service
agreements and warranties to its customers, consumers will place less value on
those service agreements and warranties and will be more likely to turn to
competitors. 45 Reducing the risk of financial distress increases consumers’
valuation of its service agreements and warranties, and this perceived increase in
value is reflected in the cash flows to the firm and in the price consumers are
willing to pay for the product. 46
Last, hedging also reduces underinvestment risk. When a corporation is in
financial distress, shareholders become reluctant to provide additional equity for
even attractive, value-adding projects because part of the added value will go to
lenders or bondholders. 47 Hedged cash flows, thus, reduce the tension between
shareholders and bondholders by providing firms the liquidity needed to expand
operations in economic downturns. 48
As suggested by the above, shares in a corporation with less risk exposure
trade at a premium. This is because investors have two basic objectives: (i) they
seek high returns; and (ii) they want those returns to be “dependable, stable, [and]
not subject to uncertainty.” 49 Because hedging guards against risk exposure,
increases shareholder value, and increases the dollar value of a firm, fiduciaries
have a fiduciary duty to hedge.

2. Hedging Is Statutorily Accepted and Encouraged
Regulators are fully aware of the hedging activities of corporations, and
federal statutes reflect a favorable approach to the use of derivatives to hedge
risk. 50 In addition to the U.S. tax code, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009 (hereafter, and better known as “the Dodd-Frank Act”) 51
and the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (hereafter “ERISA”) 52 are
glaring examples of how U.S. federal statutes encourage derivative hedging
strategies.
The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted following one of the worst financial
downturns in history, excludes from registration any firm “whose primary
business is providing financing, and uses derivatives for the purpose of hedging
underlying commercial risks related to interest rate and foreign currency
exposures within its organization.” 53 The Dodd-Frank Act also provides an
44. Clifford W. Smith & Rene M. Stultz, The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies, 20 J. FIN. &
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 391–405 (1985).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Charles Smithson, Does Risk Management Work?, RISK 44–45 (July 1999).
48. Id.
49. HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 6 (Basil
Blackwell ed., 2d ed. 1991).
50. See generally Treas. Reg. 26 U.S.C. §1.1221-2(b); Internal Revenue Code § 1221 (b)(2).
51. See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
H.R. 4173 (codified, in relevant part, as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.) [hereafter DoddFrank Act].
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
53. Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 1a(33)(D)) (note that the exemption does not extend
to treatment as a major securities-based swap participant).
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exception to its clearing mandate for non-financial businesses 54 using “swaps to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk.” 55
Additionally, section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act, popularly known as the
Volker Rule, creates a general prohibition against insured depository institutions
acting as major swap participants. 56 However, the Volker Rule does not apply if
insured depository institutions limit their activities to “[h]edging and other similar
risk mitigating activities directly related to the insured depository institution’s
activities. 57
While the Dodd-Frank Act generally creates stringent rules for the use of
derivatives, it exempts and excludes hedging activities. Thus, by design, the DoddFrank Act encourages the use of derivatives to hedge risk.
Similarly, Employee Retirement Income Security Act Regulations
(“ERISA”), enacted during a period of volatile exchange rates and “oil price
shocks,” 58 include provisions that encourage (if not induce) hedging. ERISA
imposes on trustees of pension and employee benefit trusts a duty of prudent
investing, 59 and requires consideration of the role that each investment plays in
the context of the portfolio as a whole. 60 Trustees are neither restricted nor
obligated to use specific types of investments or investment strategies. In other
words, the use of derivatives in pension plans is no longer imprudent per se.
Consistent with modern portfolio theory, federal courts look at the complete
portfolio rather than investments in isolation in ERISA litigation. 61
Furthermore, ERISA also repealed the prior rule against delegation of
investment responsibilities in response to the growing complexity of managing
54. The Act defines a “financial entity” as ‘‘(I) a swap dealer; (II) a security-based swap dealer; (III) a
major swap participant; (IV) a major security-based swap participant; (V) a commodity pool; (VI) a private
fund as defined in section 202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80-b-2(a)); (VII) an
employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002); (VIII) a person predominantly engaged in activities that are in the
business of banking, or in activities that are financial in nature, as defined in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.” Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(c).
55. Id. at § 723(a)(3) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)).
56. § 716(b)(2)(A) (the exemption does not apply to insured depository institutions acting as a swap
dealer, which will be considered a “swap entity” under the provisions of the Act).
57. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(13)(d)(1)). The Rule exempts (a) underwriting and marketmaking activities to the extent such activities are designed not to exceed the reasonably-expected near term
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties; (b) risk-mitigating hedging activities that are designed to
reduce specific risks to the banking entity in connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions,
contracts, or other holdings; (c) customer-driven investments; (d) investments in government and
government-related obligations; and certain other permitted activities. Id.
58. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter
ERISA]; see also PHILLIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR CONTROLLING MARKET RISK
4–7 (1997) (noting that the abrogation of the fixed currency exchange rate system in 1971 led to “flexible and
volatile exchange rates”, and the early 1970s were permeated by high inflation and oil prices).
59. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i). The official commentary to the regulation explains: “The ‘prudence’
rule in the Act sets forth a standard built upon, but that should and does depart from, traditional trust law
in certain respects. The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a specific
investment or investment course of action does not render such investment or investment course of action
either per se prudent or per se imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be judged
without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action plays within the overall
plan portfolio.” 44 Fed. Reg. 37, 221, at 37,222 (June 26, 1979).
61. Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 322 (5th Cir. 1999)
(reversing the district court for reviewing the investment in question “in isolation under the common law trust
standard, instead of according to the modern portfolio theory required by ERISA policy as expressed by the
Secretary’s regulations”).
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financial assets and the need for trustees to rely on delegation to professionals to
discharge their obligations. 62 Given the bifurcation of derivatives and securities
regulations and the complexity of derivatives, the ability to delegate strongly
appears to encourage the use of derivatives as hedging instruments.

3. The Duty to Hedge Is Grounded in the Business Judgment Rule
While the above demonstrates the prudence of hedging, the corporate duty
to hedge is ultimately grounded in the business judgment rule. Under current U.S.
law, plaintiff-shareholders seeking to hold corporate fiduciaries liable are faced
with overcoming the “business judgment rule”. 63
a. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule provides that in the absence of fraud, illegality,
self-dealing, or other misconduct:
[D]irectors of a corporation . . . are clothed with [the] presumption, which the law
accords to them, of being [motivated] in their conduct by a bona fide regard to the
interest of the corporation whose affairs the stockholders have committed to their
charge. 64

In other words:
[Because] it is both the duty and the right of the board of directors to manage the
affairs of the corporation, courts will defer to business decisions made by the board
of directors, as long as in making those decisions the directors complied with their
fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care and good faith. 65

The rule is designed to shield faithful directors who have otherwise adhered to
their fiduciary duties but made honest errors of judgment. 66
The business judgment rule is multi-faceted and has procedural and
substantive implications. On one hand, the rule generally creates “a presumption
in favor of [the corporate fiduciary’s] actions.” 67 Thus, the burden is on the
plaintiff-shareholder to prove that the director breached one of its three fiduciary
duties: due care, good faith, or loyalty. 68 Failing to do so, a plaintiff “is not entitled
to any remedy unless the transaction constitutes waste . . . [in other words] the

62.
63.

29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2).
Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case For Derivatives Use Advocating a Corporate
Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 636–37 (2000).
64. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).
65. RALPH C. FERRERA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 5.01 (1996);
see generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the rule presumes informed
business decisions).
66. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
67. Douglas M. Branson, Indiana Supreme Court Lecture: The Rule That Isn’t a Rule – The Business
Judgement Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002).
68. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
68. Id. at 872; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Although the business judgment rule has generally been applied
as a tripartite test (whether a corporate fiduciary breach the duty of due care, loyalty or good faith), the
Delaware Supreme Court more recently construed good faith as a “subsidiary element” of the duty of loyalty.
See also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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exchange was so one-sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” 69
Substantively, the rule creates affirmative duties in the corporate
fiduciaries while shielding them from liability if the shareholder fails to rebut the
presumption. 70 It should be noted that in some jurisdictions the rule is construed
as providing an affirmative defense to directors. 71 In other words, the rule
“provides a safe harbor that makes both directors and their actions unassailable
if certain prerequisites have been met.” 72
In the context of litigation, the rule is a means for conserving judicial
resources and promoting judicial efficiency, thereby permitting courts to avoid
being mired down in rehashing decisions that are inherently subjective and illsuited for judges, as opposed to business men and women. 73 Finally, the rule is the
law’s implementation of broad economic policy, built upon economic freedom and
the encouragement of informed risk taking. 74

4. The Duty of Care
The fiduciary duty of care requires directors to take an active and direct role
in the decision-making process. 75 The fiduciary duty of due care also requires that
directors of a corporation both: (i) “use that amount of care which ordinarily careful
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances;” and (ii) “consider all
material information reasonably available.” 76 Liability for a breach of the duty of
care can arise in two contexts:
First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss
because that decision was ill advised or “negligent.” Second, liability to the
corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board
to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the
loss. 77

The first class of cases is subject to review under the business judgment rule. 78 To
invoke the rule’s protections in the context of a duty of care, “directors have a duty
to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.” 79 When determining whether a breach
occurred, courts look to objective facts including the amount of time available to
directors to prepare for the meeting, 80 the extent of the directors’ preparation for

69. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
70. Id.
71. Branson, supra note 67, at 632.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989).
76. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 749.
77. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. v. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
78. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
79. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
80. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 880 (citing Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974)) (one and a half
days’ notice is insufficient).
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the meeting, 81 time spent by the directors at the meeting, 82 the type and quality
of the advice available to the directors, 83 the directors’ participation in the
meeting, 84 and the documents the directors reviewed. 85
If a company’s “directors individually and the board collectively” failed to
inform themselves “fully and in a deliberate manner,” then they “lose the
protection of the business judgment rule” and the court is “required to scrutinize
the challenged transaction under an entire fairness 86 standard of review.” 87 In this
regard, gross negligence is the proper standard for determining whether a
business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one. 88
As for the second class of cases, where a loss results from director inaction,
the protections of the business judgment rule do not apply. 89 Under such
circumstances, a “sustained or systematic failure” of a director to exercise
reasonable oversight constitutes a breach of the director’s duty of care. 90

5. The Duty of Loyalty
Traditionally, a breach of the duty of loyalty occurred where “a director
[took] for herself something which should otherwise belong to the corporation.” 91
Corporate fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to act in the interest of the
corporation and its shareholders, and thus are to refrain from self-dealing and
usurpation of corporate opportunities without informed consent of the
corporation. 92
To allege a breach of the duty of loyalty based on actions or omissions of the Board,
the Plaintiff must “plead facts demonstrating that a majority of a board that
approved the transaction in dispute was interested and/or lacked independence.”
To show that a director was interested, it is usually necessary to show that the
director was on both sides of a transaction or received a benefit not received by the
shareholders. 93
81. Cede, 634 A.2d at 371 (holding that the directors’ failure to inform themselves of all reasonably
available material information to the decision at hand was a violation of the duty of care).
82. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (2002) (holding that the two–hour meeting was insufficient
to satisfy the duty of care).
83. Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc. 532 A.2d 1324, 1337 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that a business decision
made without expert advice violated the duty of care).
84. Id. (directors’ failure to consider facts relevant to the merger violated the duty of care).
85. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (directors’ failure to review merger documents violated the duty of
care).
86. In order to satisfy an entire fairness review of a challenged transaction, a board must demonstrate
that its transaction was the product of both fair dealing and produces a fair price to shareholders. See
generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). This analysis is not necessarily bifurcated, and
reviewing courts may blur the line with the outcome of one prong influencing the outcome of the other. Id. at
711.
87. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993).
88. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
89. Disney, 907 A.2d at 748.
90. Id. at 750 (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. v. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
91. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1769, 1795 (2007) (laying forth the notion that the duty of loyalty is “an obligation of devotion” to the
corporation including more than simply not enriching oneself at the company’s expense).
92. Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 593 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
93. Continuing Creditors’ Comm. of Star Telecomms, Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 460 (D. Del.
2004); see also Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (“[A] director is considered interested where
he or she will receive a personal financial benefit from, a transaction that is not equally shared by the
stockholders.”).
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However, the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stone v. Ritter
clarified that, under Delaware law, any act made in bad faith is also disloyal. 94
[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the
fiduciary fails to act in good faith.
***
Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating
a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by
failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith. 95

Thus, there is no “triad” of separate fiduciary duties; when a director acts in bad
faith he has also violated his duty of loyalty. 96 Put another way, knowing breaches
of any duty, including knowing breaches of the duty of care, are henceforth
disloyal. 97

6. Good Faith
A fiduciary breaches the duty of good faith when, among other things, he
takes, or fails to take any action that demonstrates a “faithlessness or lack of true
devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.” 98 The fiduciary
duty of good faith; and, thus, the duty of loyalty are breached:
[W]here the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for
his duties. 99

94. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
95. Id.; see also Morris v. Zelch (In re Reg. Diagnostics LLC), 372 B.R. 3, 30 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding
that “under Delaware law a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty can be premised on a failure to act in good
faith”); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I), 353 B.R. 324, 344 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006)
(“[M]aking a decision that is not in the corporation’s best interests—abdicating one’s directorial duties—is a
breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith, . . . which is just another permutation of the fiduciary's duty
of loyalty.”) (emphasis added) (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65–68 (Del. 2006));
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“A director cannot act loyally towards the
corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest.”).
96. Stone thus explicitly affirms Strine’s assertion in Guttman that, “[a] director cannot act loyally
towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best
interest.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. The terminology here is rather confusing because the opinion also explicitly
affirms Guttman’s definition of good faith as a “‘subsidiary element,’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty
of loyalty.’” Stone, 911 A.2d at 370, citing Guttman. At the same time, however, Stone expands the meaning
of disloyalty to include acts for which the director did not have a “good faith belief that her actions are in the
corporation’s best interest.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. While the court narrows the definition of bad faith so that
it becomes merely a subset of disloyalty, it expands the definition of disloyalty to include acts that earlier
might have simply met the definition of bad faith but not necessarily disloyalty in the sense of being selfserving.
97. In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., et al., 388 B.R. 548, 577; 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1586 ** 35 (citing
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 933 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
98. In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. at 577; Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(citing Stone for this proposition).
99. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 66–67. (Del. 2006) (en banc); see also
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006).
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In other words, a director acts disloyally, under Delaware law, if he does not
believe in good faith that his actions are in the best interests of the corporation.
“[T]he reason for the disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying
motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the
corporation’s best interest does not make it faithful, as opposed to faithless.” 100
Therefore, bad faith, and hence disloyalty, is not limited merely to actions which
plainly benefit the director at the expense of the corporation but include any of a
number of “moral failings.” 101
Bad faith can be the result of “any emotion [that] may cause a director to
[intentionally] place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare
of the corporation,” including greed, “hatred, lust, envy, revenge . . . shame or
pride”. Sloth could certainly be an appropriate addition to that incomplete list if it
constitutes a systematic or sustained shirking of duty. 102

Thus, the faithless director knows that he is acting against the best interests of
the corporation due to a “moral failing.” While ignorance, alone, is probably not
enough to constitute a breach of bad faith, “ignorance attributable to any of the
moral failings previously listed could constitute bad faith.” 103 “Deliberate
indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is . . . conduct that is clearly
disloyal to the corporation.” 104
The duty of good faith, includes a duty to monitor, and makes actionable
situations in which “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”. 105
The “imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.” 106 Therefore, plaintiffs must
plead “particularized facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.” 107
B. Legal Precedent Shows That Corporate Fiduciaries Have a Duty to Hedge
Unlike the corresponding duty to diversify, the duty to hedge, at this
moment, does not enjoy a rich history of common law precedent. First, as noted
above, corporations are already hedging. Second, the media’s portrayal of
derivatives as high risk instruments has resulted in a “blame the product”
mentality. 108 Third, exculpatory and indemnification clauses were thought to limit

100.
101.
102.

Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (italics added).
In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A. 2d at 754.
Id., wrongly citing Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (the quote actually comes from In re RJR Nabisco,
Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1159 (1989) (italics added)).
103. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 754.
104. Id. at 755. In a case decided only a few weeks after Disney V, Chancellor Strine called it “conscious
torpor” where a director knowingly decides to fail to discharge his fiduciary obligations. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of
La. v. Adinioff, 900 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2006).
105. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Guttman, 833 A.2d. at 506).
108. Borkus, supra note 5, at 153.
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liability and, thus, until, recent clarification, deterred lawsuits 109 and induced
settlements. 110
According to commentators, the duty to hedge is an outgrowth of the duty
of care. 111 However, a breach of the duty of care was believed to be non-actionable
if a corporate fiduciary had an exculpatory clause in her contract. After Stone,
however, certain breaches of the duty of care, such as a knowing breach, will not
enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule because they breach the duty
of loyalty as well. 112
By subsuming good faith into the duty of loyalty . . . Stone extends the domain of
the duty of loyalty to cases in which the defendant received no financial benefit
. . . [and thus,] [l]iability for acts in bad faith . . . will look a lot more like that
imposed in cases involving a breach of the duty of care than the duty of loyalty. 113

This is significant because some jurisdictions, like Delaware, provide for the
indemnification of directors and officers for litigation expenses under specified
circumstances. 114 Yet indemnification statutes specifically limit certain
indemnification provisions to persons who “acted in good faith and in a manner
the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation.” 115 Thus, directors and officers “can be indemnified for liability (and
litigation expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not
for a violation of the duty to act in good faith.” 116 As a result, the duty of care, and,
thus, the duty to hedge, again has teeth.

1. Development of the Fiduciary Responsibility Structure
In the seminal case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 117 some of the directors there
conducted a “preliminary study” in which they simply crunched numbers
109. See NANCY E. BARTON, DENNIS J. BLOCK, & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 167–72 (5th ed. 1998) (identifying only twelve modern cases as
finding actionable director negligence without a concurrent breach of loyalty or a conflict of interest).
110. See e.g., Charal Inv. Co. v. Rockefeller, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98, 979, at 93,761 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7,
1995); Axler v. Wagner, No. 94-CV-3097 (E.D. Pa.) (settled out of court); In re Piper Funds, Inc. Institutional
Gov't Income Portfolio Litig., 71 F.3d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1995) (involving a class action suit that alleged
negligent misrepresentations, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the federal securities laws, which
settled for $70 million); Smith v. Citron, (C.D. Cal.) (consisting of a class action that alleged the defendants
recklessly gambled with public money by investing in high-risk, volatile derivatives which were excessively
leveraged and not adequately hedged against loss).
111. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 63; see generally Borkus, supra note 5; George Crawford, A
Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 307 (1995).
112. Further, in the wake of Disney V and Stone, courts must reevaluate the scope of the protections
granted by 102(b)(7). Focusing on the language of the law itself (and not its widely accepted paraphrase), it
appears that 102(b)(7) allows waivers of liability for most breaches of duty of care but not those breaches of
that duty that might be considered disloyal according the Delaware Supreme Court’s definition in Stone. It is
entirely possible then, after Stone, that a 102(b)(7) waiver would no longer protect directors for the
authorization of a risky project where the directors deliberately ignored the relationship between the chances
of success of the project and its rewards for the corporation.
113. Bainbridge et al. at 585. Including as disloyalty acts that do not benefit the director does indeed make
the duty of good faith look a lot like the duty of care. Essentially, Stone’s duty of loyalty includes breaches of
the duty of care in bad faith.
114. Del. Corp. § 145
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 858 (Del. 1985).
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compiling data from two arbitrary stock prices. 118 This preliminary study became
the basis of a “fair price” for the company’s stock. 119 The Van Gorkom court pointed
out that this method of calculation does not necessarily yield the best price;
therefore, the business judgment rule did not protect the directors who had failed
to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available prior to
making a business decision. 120
The Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that the duty of care requires
directors to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to
them, which includes alternatives, before making a business decision. 121 The Van
Gorkom Court held that the board of directors was grossly negligent where they
failed to act with informed, reasonable deliberation in agreeing to a merger
proposal. 122
Similarly, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 123
directors conditionally agreed to a tender offer made by Viacom. 124 However,
Paramount subsequently entered into a “no shop” agreement with Viacom,
providing that it would not consider or accept other offers without self-imposed
liability. 125 As a result, Paramount refused to consider a more lucrative unsolicited
offer tendered by QVC. 126 The Paramount Court held that Paramount’s directors
had an obligation to search for the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders, including all subsequent offers, and, thus, violated their fiduciary
duties, 127 since Paramount was required to act on an informed basis and to secure
the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. 128
As in Van Gorkom, Paramount’s directors had a duty to become fully
informed on the alternatives available. 129 The Paramount Court found that
Paramount’s directors’ process was not reasonable, and the result achieved for the
shareholders was unreasonable under the circumstances. 130
Although the plaintiffs were corporations tendering merger offers and not
shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision indicates that this case
would have met all of the necessary requirements to overcome the business
judgment rule. 131 Additionally, the court indicated that Paramount’s justification
for its actions would not have met the entire fairness standard. 132
In 1992, the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a duty to hedge
head-on in Brane v. Roth. 133 In Brane, the shareholders of a commercial grain
cooperative brought an action against the co-op’s directors for failure to hedge

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 875–76.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 881.

Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
Id. at 50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.

Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994).
Id. at 49.

Id.
Id.
See generally Brane v. Roth, 108 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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against commodity price risk. 134 The co-op’s gross profit had fallen continuously
for four years. 135 Following substantial losses in the third year, the co-op’s
accountant recommended hedging in the grain market to minimize future
losses. 136 Directors gave the authority to hedge to an inexperienced manager, and
the manager only hedged $20,050.00 of the co-op’s $7.3 million in total grain
sales. 137 The Brane court determined that the directors could have mitigated the
losses by using derivatives to hedge against price risk, and held that “the directors
breached their duty by their failure to . . . become aware of the essentials of
hedging to be able to monitor the business which was a proximate cause of the coop’s losses.” 138
Generally, when corporate executives make decisions based upon good faith
and honest judgment, they avoid judicial scrutiny under the business judgment
rule. 139 However, the Brane court reasoned that the fiduciaries were not protected
under the business judgment rule presumption because they failed to inform
themselves of and implement the hedging tools commonly available to grain
market participants. 140 Brane was at least partially decided along similar
reasoning to that in Van Gorkom and Paramount Communications.
Moreover, the Brane court went a step further and reasoned that there were
material issues, as well, because the corporation derived ninety percent of its
income from long 141 grain positions. 142 Thus, hedging was a reasonable business
expectation in the grain co-op business and reasonable managers would have
protected against commodity price uncertainty. 143
The Brane decision unambiguously establishes a precedent for a fiduciary
duty to hedge risk. Interestingly, the Brane Court is attentive to the fact that the
co-op derived nearly all of its profits from one source, suggesting that diluting the
risk through diversification might have changed the outcome. If dilution of risk
would indeed have changed the outcome, the case would have favored the issue of
materiality while also maintaining a consistency with trust law and its acceptance
of modern portfolio theory. 144 Nonetheless, the Brane Court highlights that grain
hedging was a common trade practice, and, thus, a reasonable business
expectation.
134. Id. at 589.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Brane v. Roth, 108 590 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 592. “To invoke the [business judgment] rule's protection directors have a duty to inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.”
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 575
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that “a director cannot take action blindly and later avoid the consequences by
saying he was not aware of the effect of the action”).
141. “Long” as used here means to “have ownership of the underlying commodity; thus, the commodity
owner possesses the insurable property and a position in a futures contract or an option on a futures contract
can be taken to shift the commodity price risk to another legal entity.” Borkus, supra note 5, at 114. “This is
no different from purchasing insurance on a house and shifting the liability to the insurance company.” Id.
142. Brane v. Roth, 108 590 N.E.2d 587, 591–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
143. Id.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b) cmt. f(3) (providing that “diversification is fundamental to
the management of risk and is therefore a pervasive consideration in prudent investment management . . .
the duty to diversify ordinarily applies even within a portion of a trust portfolio that is limited to assets of a
particular type or having special characteristics”); see also Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN.
77 (1952) (theory for which Markowitz received the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economic Science).
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Shortly after Brane, George Crawford published an influential article, A
Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 145 in which Crawford posits a situation where
the case for using derivatives was so overwhelming that a failure to use them
would be tantamount to imprudence. Specifically, Crawford describes a situation
in which a bank, acting as trustee, would incur liability where it failed to use
derivatives to hedge an under-diversified portfolio. 146 Two years later, Crawford’s
hypothesis would be tested in Levy v. Bessemer Trust Co. 147
In Levy, a post Brane case, a federal district court denied a defendant’s
motion to dismiss finding that a trust fiduciary has a duty to be informed of risk
management tools and hedging techniques. 148 Levy, a client of a financial
management and investment advisory service sued the firm, Bessemer Trust
Company (“BTC”), “for negligence, gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to supervise, breach of contract, and
fraud.” 149 The Levy court refused to dismiss the action finding that Levy
adequately pled all causes of action but breach of contract. 150
The facts in Levy are analogous to those in Brane. Similar to the co-op
deriving most of its profits from grain, Levy’s portfolio comprised mostly of one
company’s stock with restrictions on his ability to sell. 151 BTC specifically
represented to Levy that the company had “special expertise in providing financial
services and investment advice to high net-worth individuals” and managing
equity positions. 152
Like Brane, Levy recognized his risk exposure, and in numerous
conversations with BTC account representatives, stressed the importance of
hedging. 153 BTC replied that due to the restrictions on the stock’s ownership, there
was no “immediate protection from downward price movement.” 154 Six months
after hiring BTC, Levy, unsatisfied with BTC’s response, sought further advice. 155
A Paine Webber representative recommended a “European options collar”, a
combination put and call option. Levy eventually closed his account with BTC and
reopened it with Paine Webber. 156 Unfortunately, by the time Levy had fired BTC
and hired Paine Webber to enter the transaction, his price floor was $24.75 per
share and capped at $31.90 per share. 157 If BTC had entered into this type of
transaction for Levy six months earlier, his stock price would have a floor of $33.33
per share and a ceiling of $44.00 per share. 158
145. Crawford, supra note 111.
146. Id.
147. No. 97 Civ. 1785, 1997 U.S. Dist. WL 431079 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997).
148. Id.
149. Id. at * 2
150. Id. at * 3–6.
151. Id. at *1. “The stock certificate prohibited [Levy] from trading the Shares for a period of one year
from issuance.” Id. Levy informed BTC that his stock certificate contained a liquidation contingency. Id. at
*1–2.
152. Id. at *5.
153. Id. at *1–2.
154. Id. at *1 (noting that BTC employees and management claimed they were not aware of the option
strategies available to hedge Levy's position).
155. Id. at *2–4.
156. Id. (noting that Paine Webber account executives hedged Levy's investment against further price
depreciation).
157. Id. at *2.
158. Id. at *2.
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The Levy’s Court found a material question of fact in the pleadings for
breach of the fiduciary duty for a failure to hedge to supervise the hedge. 159 The
Levy court further found a material issue with BTC’s alleged breach to Levy as an
investment advisor. BTC provided “erroneous investment information . . . [and]
made misrepresentations to induce [Levy] to maintain his account with BTC
. . . .” 160 If BTC had properly advised Levy, he could have hedged the equity shares
and avoided losses.
While Levy involves a trustee, it is not without its utility in the corporate
fiduciary context:
The Levy court’s decision that the trustee breached a duty to hedge is analogous to
a corporate fiduciary’s duty to protect a business . . . a trust fiduciary also has an
implicit duty to hedge against insurable risks, especially given the availability of
information regarding modern financial management techniques. A trustee also
has a duty to protect trust corpus and the beneficiaries’ entitlements, which is
similar to a corporate duty to protect the dollar value of a business. This duty
implicitly requires that a trustee be informed of risk management tools and
hedging techniques. 161

Simply stating the trust and corporate fiduciary standards is hardly an easy
task, but Brane and Levy both illustrate to some extent their symbiotic
relationship. In addition to the difference between the standards in theory and
the standards in practice, a difference in terminology can mask the fundamental
similarities. It is common to reference the twin fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. However, the corporate duty of loyalty arises from the director’s duty to act
“in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation,” 162 and the duty of care arises from the director’s obligation to act
“with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances;” 163 overlaying both duties is the duty to act “in good
faith.” 164
A trustee owes beneficiaries the duty of loyalty 165 and the duty of
prudence 166 (and the duty of impartiality among the beneficiaries). 167
Importantly, a trustee’s duty of loyalty is grounded in a duty to “administer the
trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.” 168 Acting in the interest of
beneficiaries is really no different from acting “in the best interests of the
corporation,” and, thus, Levy’s rules are every bit as applicable to the corporate
fiduciary as they are to trustees.
By contrast, courts will not impose liability on fiduciaries engaged in bona
fide hedging strategies. For example, in Laborers National Pension Fund v.
Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, 169 the Fifth Circuit reversed a district
court determination that the defendant-bank’s purchase of interest-only
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Borkus, supra note 5, at 155–57.

Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a)(3).

Id. § 8.30(a)(2).
Id. § 8.30(a)(1).

Unif. Trust Code § 802.
Id. § 804.
Id. § 803.
Id. § 802(a).
Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999).
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mortgage-backed securities (“IO”) 170 was not a prudent investment for a pension
fund. 171
The Laborers National Pension Fund (the “Fund”) sued the defendant-bank
for breach of fiduciary duties alleging violations under ERISA. 172 The lower court
determined that the defendant-bank ignored the Fund’s investment requirements
because IOs were inconsistent investments for the Fund, and, thus, a prudent fund
manager would not invest in an IO. 173 The lower court also found expert testimony
supporting investment in IOs unpersuasive. 174
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s decision was erroneous
because modern portfolio theory under ERISA requires that investments not be
viewed in isolation. 175 The Fifth Circuit found no reasonable basis for the lower
court’s decision when the applicable law was correctly applied to the present set
of facts. 176
The court ultimately held, inter alia, that the IO purchase was a hedge
designed to protect the portfolio 177 and that the investment was a reasonable
portfolio addition, which acted as insurance against potential economic turmoil. 178
The court found that defendant-bank provided adequate testimony that the IO
investment was prudent and that the defendant-bank’s expert had properly
analyzed the IO hedge. 179
While the Fifth Circuit in Laborers National refused to hold a fiduciary
liable for his “good faith” use of hedging instruments, it also provides a precedent,
that under ERISA, there is a duty to hedge. Fiduciary duties with respect to plan
investments are grounded in a prudent investment process, with an emphasis
placed on an “appropriate consideration” 180 and a “reasoned decision-making
process” 181 given to investments and investment courses of action involved. 182 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned:
In determining compliance with ERISA’s prudent man standard, courts objectively
assess whether the fiduciary, at the time of the transaction, utilized proper
170. Id. An IO is a right to receive a portion of the interest paid on by a homebuyer against a mortgage
payments made on mortgage loans by a pool of homeowners. Each IO is paid from the stream of interest on
mortgage loans. Thus, prepayment of mortgage loans by members of the pool tends to diminish or extinguish
the yield on the related IO. The rate at which mortgages are paid off increases more than expected if interest
rates on mortgage loans decline unexpectedly prompting an unanticipated higher number of homeowners to
refinance. Given these characteristics, IOs can result in significantly greater price and yield volatility than
traditional debt securities. See Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 6 (2d Cir.1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1264, 117 S. Ct. 2433, 138 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1997). In addition, however, IOs can serve as a
hedge to prevent significant losses in value due to interest rate changes because IOs generally increase as
interest rates rise and mortgage-backed securities generally decline as interest rates rise. Id. at 3–4.
171. Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at 314–16.
172. Id. at 316–17.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 322.
175. Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 322 (5th Cir. 1999).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 321.
179. Id.
180. Reg. 2550.404a-1.
181. DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 421 (4th Cir. 2007).
182. It should be noted that although Reg. 2550 404a-1 is provided as a “safe harbor” or nonexclusive
means of satisfying prudence requirements, courts have looked to its provisions for guidance in determining
whether investment actions were “prudent.” See also Cal. Ironworkers Field Pension Trust v. Loomis Sayles
& Co., 259 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
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methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the investment; acted in a manner
as would others familiar with such matters; and exercised independent judgment
when making investment decisions. “[The ERISA] test of prudence is one of
conduct, and not a test of the result of performance of the investment. The focus of
the inquiry is how the fiduciary acted in his selection of the investment, and not
whether his investments succeeded or failed.” Thus, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged
transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the
investment and to structure the investment. 183

However, ERISA prudence requirements broadly cover all aspects of the
plan investment process, extending far beyond initial decisions to enter into
investments. Under the “prudence rule” the “appropriate consideration”
requirement applies to both “investment[s]” and “investment course[s] of action;”
and an “investment course of action” is defined as “any series or program of
investments or actions related to a fiduciary’s performance of his investment
duties.” 184 The Fifth Circuit found that:
Investments in derivatives are subject to the fiduciary responsibility rules in the
same manner as are any other plan investments. In determining whether to invest
in a particular derivative, plan fiduciaries are required to engage in the same
general procedures and undertake the same type of analysis that they would in
making any other investment decision. This would include, but not be limited to, a
consideration of how the investment fits within the plan’s investment policy, what
role the particular derivative plays in the plan's portfolio, and the plan’s potential
exposure to losses.
* * *

Plan fiduciaries have a duty to determine the appropriate methodology used to
evaluate market risk and the information that must be collected to do so. Among

other things, this would include, where appropriate, stress simulation models
showing the projected performance of the derivatives and of the plan's portfolio
under market conditions. Stress simulations are particularly important because
assumptions that may be valid for normal markets may not be valid in abnormal
markets, resulting in significant losses․ 185

Furthermore, courts have recognized an ongoing “duty to monitor”
investments, notwithstanding delegation of management authority to third
parties. 186 As demonstrated by Laborers National, applicable law generally holds
that the prudent investment process is reviewed from the standpoint of experts
and in light of available industry standards. Courts hold that the ERISA prudent
person standard is applied from the perspective of “a prudent fiduciary with
experience dealing with a similar enterprise.” 187 Where fiduciaries lack expertise
183. Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 313–14 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted).
184. Dept. of Labor Reg. 2550.404a-1(c)(2).
185. Id. (citing the Dept. of Labor Letter of Guidance and Statement on Derivatives).
186. See generally Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that Defendants failed to
monitor the fund's solvency and adjust levels and Defendants failed to utilize due care in selecting and
monitoring the fund's service providers and in reviewing the performance of trustees); see generally Harley
v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that the trustees’ delegation of
responsibility to an investment advisor did not relieve the trustees of their fiduciary obligation to monitor
investments).
187. United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y., 909 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing Marshall v. Snyder, 1 Empl. Ben. Cases (BNA) 1878, 1886 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
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in a specific area being considered, court hold that they have an affirmative duty
to seek out such expertise. 188
Additionally, in review of whether a fiduciary’s methods employed and
information reviewed satisfy ERISA prudence requirements, courts look to
prevailing industry methods and standards—for example, the stress stimulation
model in Laborer’s National. 189 This model essentially means that although
standards for ERISA prudence requirements may be reviewed by attorneys and
litigated in courtrooms, they are ultimately determined by the investment
industry and its experts. 190
Finally, courts routinely look to trust law for guidance when analyzing
ERISA claims (to the extent not inconsistent with ERISA). 191 As noted above, the
common law of trusts already provides precedent for fiduciary liability in duty to
hedge cases—Brane and Levy.
Based upon the foregoing, a wholesale rejection of hedging strategies would
certainly constitute a failure to give “appropriate consideration”, and as indicated
above, a lack of expertise would provide no defense against such a claim. Thus, at
a minimum, ERISA fiduciaries must give “good faith” consideration to hedging
strategies.
While Laborers National, by analogy, supports a corporate duty to hedge, it
is important to point out a few differences between corporate and trust fiduciaries.
It is commonly stated that ERISA fiduciaries have a higher duty under the law
than corporate fiduciaries. 192 This is because ERISA fiduciaries, unlike their
corporate counterparts, are unable to invoke the business judgment rule for
protection. 193
As of this Article, the business judgment rule has not been directly applied
in a similar case. Likewise, courts have not answered the question of how
shareholders might shift their burden of proof back to directors by demonstrating
a breach of duty for losses under similar circumstances.
In another ERISA case, Gilbert v. EMG Advisors, 194 the court, highlighting
that the ERISA fiduciary duties were the highest known to the law, held that an
investment manager had breached his fiduciary duties for failing to be informed
of all material information before investing certain assets belonging to a
188. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1985); Katsaros v. Cody,
568 F. Supp. 360, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affirmed in relevant part, 744 F.2d 270, citing Donovan v. Bierwirth,
680 F.2d 263, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1982).
189. Cal. Ironworkers v. Loomis Sayles & Co., 259 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing “appropriate
consideration” under DOL Reg. 2550.404a-1). The district court found more persuasive Loomis’ evidence that
the Bloomberg system was the tool prevalently used in the industry and that only a few portfolio managers
were using OAS analysis, and it made factual findings to that effect.” Id.; see also DiFelice v. U.S. Airways,
436 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.V.A., 2006) (“In the present context, this means that U.S. Airways was required to act
pursuant to the standards of the investment industry . . .”).
190. See generally Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, 173 F.3d 313, 313–14
(5th Cir. 1999).
191. See Cal. Ironworkers, 259 F.3d at 1047 (citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney
Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000)) (“The common law of trusts is incorporated into analysis of ERISA claims
unless inconsistent with the statute’s language, structure or purpose.”).
192. Gilbert v. EMG Advisors, 1999 WL 160382, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2004).
193. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)); see also Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.
1996) (“The business judgment rule is a creature of corporate, not trust, law” that is inapplicable to ERISA
breach cases that rely on a prudent person standard.”).
194 . 1999 WL 160382, at *1.
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retirement fund in a complex derivatives scheme. 195 Unlike Laborer’s National,
the defendants in Gilbert did not act on an informed basis.
The above provides the general framework for a corporate fiduciary duty to
hedge. While the Brane decision addressed the issue of whether there is a
corporate fiduciary duty to hedge, it left open the question of when the decision
not to hedge becomes a breach of duty.
C. Determining Elements of a Breach of the Duty to Hedge
In A Trust Fiduciary’s Duty to Implement Capital Preservation Strategies
using Financial Derivative Techniques 196 Randall Borkus asserts that “[w]hen
determining a breach of the duty to hedge, a court should ask whether the
information is material [and thus] there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an investment
decision.” 197 In the corporate fiduciary context, “the fact that management fails to
hedge an ordinarily hedgeable risk appears on its face to be information that an
investor would find material to the decision of whether or not to invest.” 198 Thus,
the Brane decision:
[C]an be interpreted as a benchmark for setting a reasonable corporate fiduciary
duty to hedge that protects shareholders from negligent managers who fail to stay
reasonably informed about common industry risk management practices. . . .
Therefore, a reasonable principal would view a fiduciary’s decision not to insure
the buildings as a material breach of the duty to hedge against an insurable loss. 199

The key to determining whether a breach of the duty to hedge has occurred
is whether a corporate fiduciary has fulfilled his duty to be informed about
material risks and any available hedging and risk management strategies. In
other words, a corporate fiduciary must, at a minimum, pay attention to
information regarding material risks and options to mitigate such risk.
Thereafter, if a corporate fiduciary acts imprudently or fails to act where he has a
known duty to act, he will be held liable. 200

1. Fiduciaries in the “Stone” Age
In the time since Brane, Levy, and National Laborer’s “good faith”
jurisprudence has evolved over a series of Delaware Supreme Court cases. While
the cases mostly involved a corporate fiduciary’s duty to monitor, the reasoning
can easily apply to situations in which directors choose—or choose not—to take
affirmative risks on behalf of the corporation.

195. Id.
196. Borkus, supra note 5, at 127.
197. Id. at 151.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Barton, supra note 109, at 40–43 (stating that the protections of the rule will not apply when the
director or officer is interested, did not actually make a decision, made an uninformed decision, or was grossly
negligent); see also Miller v. Schreyer, 683 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (explaining that “where the
wrong alleged is inaction of the board rather than a conscious decision . . . the business judgment rule is
inapplicable”).

Vol. 1, Fall 2012

49

Global Markets Law Journal
By clarifying the definition of good faith in Stone, the Delaware Supreme
Court invites the opportunity to re-evaluate the way that the business judgment
rule addresses risk-taking by corporate fiduciaries. As Stone established, it is not
good faith, “where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that
of advancing the best interests of the corporation.” 201 Therefore, deliberately
failing to pay attention to the risks of pursuing a new idea or to the risks of an
investment in a highly uncertain financial instrument would be bad faith and
would therefore fall outside the protections of the business judgment rule.
Stone introduces a higher threshold—only knowingly careless conduct
becomes disloyal conduct and, thus, bad faith. 202 Thus, courts may now impose
liability for knowing failures to pay attention when authorizing affirmative risks,
or failing to hedge them. Under the Stone formulation of “good faith” directors who
have indeed acted disloyally—by failing either to pay attention or to engage in any
kind of business judgment at all—lose the protections afforded under the business
judgment rule.
According to Steven Bainbridge, et al., when designing oversight and
compliance programs, directors inevitably must take risks that may or may not
turn out to benefit the company. 203 Weighing the costs and benefits of certain
safeguards against rules violations, a board might decide that the safeguards are
simply not worth the price given the likelihood of a potential violation and the
gravity of the harm it would do. 204 According to Bainbridge et al., assuming that
the directors arrived at the decision not to implement the safeguards in good faith,
they would plainly be protected under the business judgment rule. 205
Seen in this light, the decision to assume a risk by not implementing a costly
safeguard is therefore not different from the decision to take a risk by pursuing,
for example, a new and untested technology, or to invest in financial instruments
backed by sub-prime loans; at least they are not different regarding the way a
court should evaluate the good faith of the corporate authorities who chose to take
the risk in the first place. The decision to not implement a safeguard (i.e., the
decision to not hedge) can only be arrived at in good faith by finding that it is not
in the company’s best interest.
Finally, corporate fiduciaries, like trust fiduciaries, have a duty to consult
experts and delegate hedging strategies to those with the skill to implement such

201. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
202. Still, the threshold might very well allow adjudication of claims against corporate directors who
approved investment in mortgage-backed securities where the directors plainly did not take care to ensure
that the nature of risk involved was understood. Clearly this is one significant component of the meltdown of
2008. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, How Wall Street Lied to Its Computers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/how-wall-streets-quants-lied-to-their-computers/ (describing how
Wall Street investment firms “continued to trade very complex securities concocted by their most creative
bankers even though their risk management systems weren’t able to understand the details of what they
owned”); see also Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at 1.
203. Bainbridge et al. at 600–01.
204. Id. at 601.
205. Id. (“After all, a decision not to act does not differ from a decision to take action. Accordingly, the
thrust of Allen’s opinion [in Caremark] suggests that the business judgment rule ought to protect directors
who rationally elect against adopting a compliance program after weighing the costs against the benefits.”).
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strategies. 206 As noted above, liability, however, does not terminate at
delegation. 207

2. A Few Words on the Duty of Oversight and Vigilance
Under the Caremark standard, a director breaches the duty to be vigilant
by “utterly fail[ing] to implement any reporting or information system or controls”
or “having implemented such system or controls, consciously fail[ing] to monitor
or oversee its operations.” 208 Most notably, the court identified a scienter
requirement to prove a breach of the duty to monitor, stating “imposition of
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging
their fiduciary obligations.” 209
In the wake of the $2 billion in losses to J.P. Morgan, CEO Jamie Dimon
claimed J.P. Morgan made a “terrible, egregious mistake” as it tried to hedge
corporate bonds it held through a series of derivatives that led to significant paper
losses that continue to grow. 210 In a conference call disclosing the loss, Dimon said
that the bank’s trading strategy was “poorly reviewed, poorly executed and poorly
monitored.” 211
In his recent article, Corporate Control: Regulators Need to Regulate,
Richard Leblanc looks at the widespread corporate malfeasance and
mismanagement, including recent events at UBS, allegedly involving rogue trader
Kweku Adoboli, concluding:
Risk management, corporate governance and banking reforms to date have been
wholly inadequate . . . most corporate directors simply do not understand complex
derivative products, and we are demanding too much of them in expecting
otherwise. . . . Current and former CEOs may not understand derivatives, and
there is evidence that CEOs do not make better directors. 212

Leblanc’s observations are both alarming and obvious. The widespread, haphazard
use of derivative instruments in the current “too big to fail” economy coupled with
gross mismanagement 213 has already lead to a global economic meltdown. 214 Given
the apparent willingness of CEOs to repeat their mistakes, at what point does it
206. Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc. 532 A.2d 1324, 1337 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that decision made
without expert advice violated the duty of care); see also The Group of Thirty Global Study Group,
DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES & PRINCIPLES 1 (1993) (recommending that top management obtain an extensive
understanding of hedging and derivatives use before agreeing to implement strategies for their use for risk
management purposes).
207. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–20, 924 (Del. 2000) (finding that directors of subsidiary were
not entitled to business judgment rule protection because they delegated their decision to a parent corporation
when they themselves “had an ultimate statutory duty and fiduciary responsibility to make an informed and
independent decision”).
208. Id.
209. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (emphasis added). In re-formulating the Caremark
standard the court borrowed language from the definition of good faith, specifically the use of the word
“conscious”, first set forth by Chancellor Chandler in Disney II as a “conscious disregard of for one’s
responsibilities” (emphasis added). Thus, there is an explicit connection between the duty to monitor standard
set forth in Caremark and the duty of good faith standard set forth in the Disney cases.
210. Peter J. Henning, J.P. Morgan’s Loss: Illegal or Just Bad Judgment, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/jpmorgans-loss-illegal-or-just-bad-judgment/ (quoting Jamie Dimon).
211. Id.
212. Richard Leblanc, Corporate Control: Regulators Need to Regulate, CANADIAN BUS., Sept. 20, 2011.
213. Id. (stating “[g]ross mismanagement” might be too kind).
214. Id.
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become actionable?
Three recent opinions provide a glimpse at how courts will address
shareholder claims in which directors breached their fiduciary duties in managing
risk in the future—American International Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative
Litigation, 215 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 216 and In re
Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation. 217 These cases arose from the
fallout of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. In each, shareholders brought
derivative actions against members of the board of directors, attempting to hold
them personally responsible for failing to fulfill their oversight obligations.
In AIG, Delaware Supreme Court Vice-Chancellor Strine allowed plaintiffs
to proceed with a shareholder derivative lawsuit against AIG’s directors for
knowingly failing to stop certain fraudulent schemes carried out by the company’s
management. 218 Citing Stone, Strine noted that “directors can be held liable where
they ‘consciously failed to monitor or oversee [the company’s internal controls]
thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.’” 219 Such a failure, Strine explicitly states, can constitute a breach of the
duty of loyalty. 220 Strine’s decision is a clear affirmation that Stone’s extension of
the definition of disloyalty includes knowing breaches of the duty of care by
directors by failings in their oversight function.
In Citigroup, shareholders sued Citigroup’s directors for failing to adequately
“monitor the risk” to which the company had subjected itself in the months leading
up to the subprime mortgage meltdown. 221 The plaintiffs claimed that Citigroup
directors ignored glaring “red flags” that suggested an imminent collapse in the
sub-prime mortgage market. 222 Overly mindful of traditional theory for the
business judgment rule, Chancellor Chandler concluded that the plaintiff’s
allegations were insufficient to state a claim under Caremark. 223 Chandler
reasoned that Delaware law requires something more than evidence of wrong
decision-making to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment rule. 224
Warning signs, Chandler writes, “are not evidence that the directors
consciously disregarded their duties or otherwise acted in bad faith; at most they
are evidence that the directors made bad business decisions.” 225 Citigroup clearly
requires a conscious failure to evaluate risk at all and not simply a “failure to
predict the future.” 226
Distinguishing the allegations in Citigroup from those in AIG, Chandler
found that the AIG plaintiffs alleged that the directors knowingly failed to prevent
wrongdoing. 227 If those allegations are true, a persuasive case for bad faith exists.
In Citigroup, however, the directors merely made a wrong decision by ignoring the
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

AIG 2009 WL 366613 (Del. Ch., Feb. 10, 2009).
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
AIG, 2009 WL 366613, at 23.
Id. at 24 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)).
Id.
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 117 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 127.
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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red flags that indicated a downturn in the economy.
Fearing the risk of “hindsight bias,” Chandler posits that the failure of the
Citigroup directors to foresee the extent of the sub-prime mortgage crisis is not
evidence of bad faith, but bad judgment. To hold Citigroup directors personally
liable would require evidence of a knowing and deliberate failure to evaluate the
risks of the company’s policies, not a mere failure to predict the future. 228
However, in Countrywide, demand was excused as futile where
shareholders sued Countrywide’s directors for (i) approving an increase in the
origination of non-conforming loans; (ii) extension of loans in contravention of
company underwriting standards; and (iii) a failure to maintain appropriate
reserves and allowances to offset the company’s riskier loan portfolio. 229 In
Countrywide, directors approved a series of high risk business practices, which
resulted in the price of Countrywide stock falling from $45.00 per share to $5.00
per share between February 2007 and January 2008. 230
The plaintiffs successfully argued that the Countrywide’s directors violated
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 231 as well as their duty
to monitor under Delaware law. Unlike the Delaware Supreme Court in Citibank,
the federal court applied the “core business operations theory, to infer knowledge
of the directors by virtue of the fact the directors served on key board committees
“charged with oversight of Countrywide’s risk exposures, investment portfolio, and
loan loss reserves. . . . As such, they were in a position to recognize the significance
of these red flags, and, accordingly, investigate the extent to which underwriting
standards had been abandoned.” 232 In other words, the directors should have
known, or were at least reckless in not knowing, because it was their job to know.
The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ allegation that the failure of the
board to prevent the violation of the company underwriting standards “simply
does not square with the specific and comprehensive monitoring duties assigned
to the members of the Board.” 233 The Federal court concluded that the directors
failed to act in the face of glaringly obvious “red flags.” 234
Specifically, the federal court took notice of a public report issued by a
coalition of banking regulators condemning the type of lending practice engaged
in by Countrywide and competing lenders were reporting distress during the same
period. 235 Countrywide excused demand because plaintiffs pointed to specific “red
flags of such prominence that [defendants] must necessarily have examined and
considered them in the course of their committee oversight duties.” 236
JP Morgan CEO Jaime Dimon’s comments earlier in this section seem ready
to be entered into evidence for a breach of the duty to monitor and thus a breach
228. Id. at 127.
229. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050–51 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
230. Id.
231. Section 10(B) of the Securities Exchange Act, as amended, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), provides in
relevant part that: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange
. . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”
232. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
233. Id. at 1066.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1082.
236. Id.
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of the duty of loyalty. However, under Citibank, it seems doubtful that an action
would even survive summary judgment. If true, this would indeed be a
disappointment. The business judgment rule is designed to protect and encourage
informed decision making, not reckless gambles.
AIG, Citibank, and Countrywide perhaps raise more questions than they
answer. First, what is the proper measure of scienter? Chancellor Chandler’s
formulation sets the bar too high for the duty to have any real meaning. However,
will the “core business operations theory” find application outside of federal
securities cases?
Next, does the duty to monitor apply to actions outside of illegal acts?
Chandler distinguished wrong decisions from wrong acts. Thus, the duty to
monitor seems to be limited to traditional “bad faith” cases.
Finally, what effect do the cases above have on the duty to hedge? While
directors can be held liable for a knowing failure to hedge firm risk, at what point
does allowing an inadequate hedging strategy to continue rise to the level of a
conscious failure to oversee its operations?
Chandler’s Citibank opinion does, however, illustrate how the duty to hedge
fits right into traditional business judgment rule theory. The business judgment
rule is premised in part on informed decision making, including the decision to
assume risk. The duty to hedge does not hinder informed risk taking. Being
properly informed requires an understanding of material risk, and hedging
options. It is only where it is imprudent to not hedge firm risk that the duty has
been breached and the fiduciary has acted disloyal.
D. “A Hedge or Not a Hedge, That Is the Question”
– Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.)
By way of example, J.P. Morgan’s recent $2 billion loss is the latest
symptom of the U.S. corporate malfeasance pandemic. 237 Management, starting
with J.P. Morgan’s CEO Jamie Dimon, claim that the loss was due to a complex
hedging strategy involving hard-to-value instruments and embedded risk that
eluded the best and brightest minds at the bank until it was too late. 238
Calling J.P. Morgan’s losing bet a hedge is analogous to claiming that John
Dillinger simply made a series of bank withdrawals:
The trade was a simple bet on the difference, or “spread,” between the price of a
group of bonds and an index based on those bonds. In theory, those two prices
should be about the same. In practice, they may vary due to factors such as the
relative liquidity of the bonds and the index. At a certain point, the J.P. Morgan
trader, known as the “Whale,” took a view that the index was expensive and the
bonds were cheap. In effect, by selling the index and buying the bonds, the whale
would own the spread. As the spread comes back to normal, the whale reaps
enormous profits and finally unwinds the trade by selling what he bought and
buying what he sold at better prices. 239

237. Jamie Rickards, Why J.P. Morgan’s Jamie Dimon Should Resign, U.S. NEWS (May 14, 2012),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/05/14/why-jp-morgans-jamie-dimon-should
-resign.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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Unfortunately, the voluminous size of the trade proved fatal. 240 Other market
participants, notably hedge funds, intentionally widened the spread. 241 They knew
that if they “inflict[ed] enough pain on the Whale in the form of daily mark-tomarket losses, he [would] eventually have to get out of the trade by selling it
back.” 242 Forced out of the trade, the Whale sold at a loss of $2 billion dollars. 243
E. “Context Is the Key – From That Comes the Understanding of Everything”
– Kenneth Noland
The recent crisis in the financial sector has put pressure on both legislatures
and courts to increase protections for investors while holding those responsible for
the crisis accountable. Further, the demand for accountability is fueled by the fact
that as the global economy fell precipitously, executive compensation experienced
a golden era. The following section looks briefly at the current environment and
its impact on fiduciary jurisprudence and the duty to hedge.

1. The Dimon Club
While their respective companies collapsed, corporate officers pocketed
millions. For example, Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers, collected
roughly $480 million in compensation in the years leading up to the bank’s collapse
in 2008. 244 Bank of America received $25 billion in “bail out” money in 2008, and
an additional $20 billion in 2009, yet former CEO Kenneth Lewis left with about
$83 million in pension and insurance benefits, stock, and other compensation. 245
In 2008, the same year that Citigroup accepted a $45 billion government bailout,
former CEO Vikram Pandit took home a benefits package worth $38.2 million. 246
In July 0f 2008, Martin Sullivan retired from the collapsing offices of AIG, with a
$47 million stock and benefits package; a few months later AIG was approved for
$85 billion in government bailout funds. 247 Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of the recently
indicted Goldman Sachs, was reportedly paid over $70 million in 2008 alone. 248
That same year, Goldman Sachs received $10 billion in “bail out” funding leading
many to question the rationale behind Blankfein’s massive compensation. 249
By 2009, Goldman Sachs had been charged with subprime mortgage fraud
by the SEC, which alleged that the organization deliberately marketed bad loans
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Jonathan Siban, Former Lehman Brothers Boss Attached Over Wall Street Excesses, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/3147479/FormerLehman-Brothers-boss-attacked-over-Wall-Street-excesses.html.
245. Dan Fitzpatrick, Retirement Benefits for BofA’s Lewis: $83 Million, W. ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704625004575089742035330432.html.
246. Bhattiprolu Murti, Citigroup CEO Pay, Perks, Stock-based Awards $38.2M, MARKET WATCH (Mar.
16, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/citigroup-ceo-pay-perks-stock-based.
247. Lilla Zuill, NY AG Says Targeting Exec Pay at AIG, Elsewhere, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/22/us-aig-cuomo-compensation-idUSTRE49L6I420081022.
248. Christine Harper, Goldman Shareholder Lagged CDs as Blankfein Earned $125 Million, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-21/goldman-shareholder-a-loser-to-cd-rateswhen-blankfein-earned-125-million.html.
249. Id.
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in a deceptive manner. 250 Blankfein settled with the SEC in July for $550
million. 251
J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon received a $28 million bonus package
in late 2007 despite J.P. Morgan Chase being in such poor financial shape that it
needed a $25 billion government bailout less than a year later. 252 In 2009, Dimon
received another $16 million in bonuses. 253

2. Expansion
In response, the SEC filed suit against several organizations and Congress
enacted sweeping financial reform legislation imposing new duties on certain
types of advisers and authorizes the SEC to enact new rules imposing additional
duties. Neither of these actions can restore the loss in shareholder equity. While
suing corporations appears to impose liability on those at the helm, it generally
harms shareholders. Additionally, post hoc regulation does little shareholder
value, plus it increases transaction costs—costs that are generally passed on to
the consumer.
Like regulators, courts appear to be moving, slowly, in the direction of
expanding the concept of fiduciary duties. For example, courts have often held as
a matter of law that hedge fund advisers owe no fiduciary duties to individual
investors in a hedge fund, but only to the fund itself. The rule was reflected in the
2006 case Goldstein v. SEC 254 in which the D.C. Circuit struck down an SEC rule
requiring hedge funds to register with the SEC based on the number of investors
in the fund. Analyzing the client-adviser relationship under both prior SEC
interpretations and Supreme Court precedent dating back to 1985, it announced
that “[t]he adviser owes fiduciary duties only to the fund, not to the fund’s
investors.” 255
In the intervening years, hedge fund advisors sued by fund investors for
breach of fiduciary duties regularly invoke the principles described in Goldstein to
have such claims dismissed on the pleadings for failure to state a claim recognized
by law.
However, a recent Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Lay, 256 is
demonstrative of small but increasing willingness of the courts to impose
additional duties on advisers. In Lay, an investment by the Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation in a hedge fund, gave rise to a criminal claim of
investment adviser fraud. 257 The adviser argued that the jury could not, under
Goldstein, have concluded that the adviser owed a fiduciary duty to the Bureau
because his only duties were to the fund and not to the individual investors. 258
250.
251.

SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 10 CV 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15 2010).
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The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that “Lay’s categorical argument to the
contrary is primarily based upon reading too much into the holding of the District
of Columbia Circuit in Goldstein.” 259 “Goldstein,” the court held, “did not stand for
the proposition that no hedge fund adviser could create a client relationship with
an investor, but rather held only that the SEC had ‘not justified treating all
investors in hedge funds as clients.’” 260
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the jury should have been afforded the
opportunity to consider various factors that could have resulted in a fiduciary duty
being established with the hedge fund investor. The Sixth Circuit cited the fact
that the fund had only a single investor in attendance in the fund, that it had
meetings with the hedge fund adviser regarding its investment indicating an
active role in the investment, and had a previous relationship with the hedge fund
manager as a financial adviser. 261 While Lay does not announce a full-blown
reversal of Goldstein, it does indicate an increased willingness to consider a hedge
fund manager as a fiduciary to the fund investor in certain circumstances, and
tempers the bright-line rule other courts have extracted from that case.
Similarly, a Connecticut state court faced with a fiduciary duty claim
against a Bernard “Bernie” Madoff related feeder fund recently came to a similar
conclusion in Retirement Program for Employees of Town of Fairfield v. Madoff. 262
There, the investment adviser for the feeder fund invoked Goldstein to argue that
the limited partners did not have standing to make a fiduciary duty claim against
it. 263 As in Lay, the court found the adviser’s previous relationship with the
investor significant and permitted the limited partners to assert the claim against
the adviser. 264 As the effects of the financial crisis percolate through the courts,
one can expect further development, and likely expansion, of fiduciary duties owed
by advisers to hedge fund and other investors.
IV. Conclusion
“[F]iduciary law plays a significant role in ensuring the continued efficacy
of the web of human interdependency by governing the conduct of fiduciaries
holding power over others.” 265
Operating in an environment in which it is known that risky decisions often
end in failure, corporate directors act imprudently per se where they fail to
consider and/or act on information to hedge on behalf of the company.
Furthermore, the holding in Stone makes it clear that directors cannot choose a
risky course of action knowing that the decision is a bad one or knowing they have
not taken care to evaluate whether or not the risks involved will benefit the
corporation. 266 In Benjamin Cordozo’s oft-quoted words:

Id. at 446.
Id. at 446–47.
Id. at 446.
In re Town of Fairfield v. Madoff, 2010 WL 2106654 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *14–15.
Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary
Jurisprudence, 91 BOS. L. REV. 928, 961 (2011).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).

Vol. 1, Fall 2012

57

Global Markets Law Journal
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A [fiduciary] is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a condition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity had been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions.
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than
that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of
this court. 267

Only with rigorous attention to the duty a fiduciary owes a company and
the imposition of the requirement that such fiduciaries never divide loyalty as
Cardozo has described above will the global economy recover from the damage
inflicted upon it by the bad faith risk takers of the early years of the twenty-first
century. Continued vigilance will diminish such wrongdoing through transparent
and expanded application of the fiduciary duties owed by a company’s caretakers.
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